We consider a non-cooperative constrained stochastic games with N players with the following special structure. With each player i there is an associated controlled Markov chain M DPi. The transition probabilities of the ith Markov chain depend only on the state and actions of controller i. The information structure that we consider is such that each player knows the state of its own MDP and its own actions. It does not know the states of, and the actions taken by other players. Finally, each player wishes to minimize a time-average cost function, and has constraints over other time-avrage cost functions. Both the cost that is minimized as well as those defining the constraints depend on the state and actions of all players. We study in this paper the existence of a Nash equilirium. Examples in power control in wireless communications are given.
Introduction
Non-cooperative games deal with a situation of several decision makers (often called agents, users or players) where the cost of each one of the players may be a function of not only its own decision but also of decisions of other players. The choice of a decision by any player is done so as to minimize its own individual cost.
Non-cooperative games also allow to model sequential decision making by non-cooperating players. They allow to model situations in which the parameters defining the games vary in time. The game is then said to be a dynamic game and the parameters that may vary in time are the states of the game. At any given time (assumed to be discrete) each player takes a decision (also called an action) according to some strategy. The vector of actions chosen by players at a given time (called a multi-action may determine not only the cost for each player at that time; it can also determine the state evolution. Each player is interested in minimizing some functions of all the costs at different time instants. In particular, we shall consider here the expected time-average costs for the players.
We consider in this paper the class of stochastic decentralized games which we call "cost coupled constrained stochastic games" and are characterized by the following:
4. There are cost functions (one per player) that depend on the states and actions of all players, and each player wishes to minimize its own cost.
We see that players "interact" only through the last two points above. It is well known that identifying equilibrium policies (even in absence of constraints) is hard. Unlike the situation in Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) in which stationary optimal strategies are known to exist (under suitable conditions), and unlike the situation in constrained MDPs (CMDPs) with a multichain structure, in which optimal Markov policies exist [13, 18] , we know that equilibrium strategies in stochastic games need in general to depend on the whole history (see e.g. [19] for the special case of zero-sum games). This difficulty has motivated researchers to search for various possible structures of stochastic games in which saddle point policies exist among stationary or Markov strategies and are easier to compute [11] . In line with this approach, we shall identify conditions under which constrained equilibria exist for cost-coupled conostrained stochastic games.
Related work. Several papers have already dealt with constrained stochastic games. In [7] , the authors have established the existence of a constnrained equilibrium in a context of centralized stochastic games, in which all players jointly control a single Markov chain and in which all players have full information on its state. Moreover, when taking decision at time t, each player has information on all actions previously taken by all players.
The special cost-coupled structure (see Definion 2.1) has been investigated in [12, 2] in zero-sum games where there is a single cost which one of the players wishes to minimize and which a second player wishes to maximize. A highly non-stationary saddle-point was obtained in [22] for a zero-sum constrained stochastic games with expected average costs.
Alghough the question of existence of an equilibrium in cost-coupled stochastic games has not been considered before, some specific applications of such games have been formulated. Indeed, these games have been used extensively by Huang, Malhamé and Caines in a series of publications [16, 17] . Although they have not established the existence of a Nash equilibrium, they have been able to obtain an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the case of a large population of players. Models concerning uplink power control, similar to the one studied in [16] , have been investigated in [3] , in which the structure of constrained equilibrium is established. We note however that in the models considered in [3] , the local Markovian states of each user are not controlled; the decisions of each user have an impact only the costs and not the transition probabilities.
The model and main result
We consider a game with N players, labeled 1, . . . , N . Define for each player i the tuple
• X i is a finite local state space of the ith player. Generic notation for states will be x, y or x i , y i . We let X := N j=1 X j be the global state space, and we define X −i := j =i X i be the global to be the set of all possible states of players other than i.
• A i is a finite set of actions. We denote by A i (x i ) the set of actions available for player i at state x. A generic notation for a vector of actions will be a = (a 1 , ..., a N ) where a i stands for the action chosen by player i.
• Define the local set of state-action pairs for player i as set
Denote the set of all global state-action pairs by K = N i=j K j , and let K −i = N j = K j denote the set of state-action pairs of all players other than i.
• P i are the transition probabilities for player i; thus P i xiaiyi is the probability that the state of player i moves from x i to y i if she chooses action a i .
• c = {c j i }, i = 1, ..., N , j = 0, 1, ..., B i is a set of immediate costs, where c j i : K → IR. Thus player i has a set of B i + 1 immediate costs; c 0 i will correspond to the cost function that is to be minimized by that player, and c j i , j > 0 will correspond to cost functions on which some constraints are imposed.
• V = {V j i }, i = 1, ..., N , j = 1, ..., B i are bounds defining the constraints (see (2) below).
• β i is a probability distribution for the initial state of the Markov chain of player i. The intial states of the players are assumed to be independent.
Histories, Information and policies. Let M 1 (G) denote the set of probability measures over a set G. Define a history of player i at time (or of length) t to be a sequence of her previous states and actions, as well as her current local state:
be the set of all possible histories of length t for player i. A policy (also called a strategy) u i for player i is a sequence u i = (u
is a function that assigns to any history of length t a probability measure over the set of actions of player i.
At time t, each player i chooses an action a i , independently of the choice of actions of other players, with probability u = (a 1 , ..., a N ) . The class of all policies defined as above for player i is denoted by U i . The collection U = N i=1 U i is called the class of multi-policies ( stands for the product space).
Stationary policies. A stationary policy for player i is a function u i :
We denote the class of stationary policies of player i by U 
A distribution β for the initial state (at time 1) and a multi-policy u together define a probability measure P u β which determines the distribution of the vector stochastic process {X t , A t } of states and actions, where
..,N . The expectation that corresponds to an initial distribution β and a policy u is denoted by E u β .
Costs and constraints. For any multi-policy u and β, define the i, j-expected average cost is defined as
A multi-policy u is called i-feasible if it satisfies:
It is called feasible if it is i-feasible for all the players i = 1, ..., N . Let U V be the set of feasible policies.
Definition 2.1 (i) A multi-policy u ∈ U v is called constrained Nash equilibrium if for each player i = 1, ..., N and for any
v i such that [u −i |v i ] is i-feasible, C i,0 (β, u) ≤ C i,0 (β, [u −i |v i ]).(3)
Thus, any deviation of any player i will either violate the constraints of the ith player, or if it does not, it will result in a cost C i,0 for that player that is not lower than the one achieved by the feasible multi-policy u. (ii) For any multi-policy u, u i is called an optimal response for player i against u −i if u is i-feasible, and if for any
(iii) A multi-policy v is called an optimal response against u if for every i = 1, ..., N , v i is an optimal response for player i against u −i .
Assumptions. We introduce the following assumptions
• (Π 1 ) Ergodicity: For each player i and for any stationary policy u i of that player, the state process of that player is an irreducible Markov chain with one ergodic class (and possibly some transient states).
• (Π 2 ) Strong Slater condition: There exists some real number η > 0 such that the following holds. Every player i has some policy v i such that for any multi-strategy u −i of the other players,
• (Π 3 ) Information: The strategy chosen by any player does not depend on the realization of the cost.
The last assumption is frequently encountered in game theory and in applications, see e.g. [9, 21, 23] . The assumption is in fact directly implied by the definition of policies. If it were allowed to have policies depend on the realization of the cost, then a player could use the costs to estimate the state and actions of the other player.
We are now ready to introduce the main result. [4] .
Proof of main result
We begin by describing the way an optimal stationary response for player i is computed for a given stationary multi-policy u. Fix a stationary policy u i for player i. With some abuse of notation, we denote for any x i ∈ X i and any y i ∈ X i ,
Denote the immediate costs induced by players other than i, when player i uses action a i and the other players use a stationary multi policy u −i , by
Next we present a Linear Program (LP) for computing the set of all optimal responses for player i against a stationary policy u −i .
(y,a)∈Ki
Define Γ(i, u) to be the set of optimal solutions of LP(i, u). Given a set of nonnegative real numbers z i = {z i (y, a), (y, a) ∈ K i (y)}, define the point to set mapping γ(i, i (y, a)[ a z i (y, a) ] −1 } is a singleton: for each y, we have that y) ), i.e. the (convex and compact) set of all probability measures over A i (y).
Define g i (z i ) to be the set of stationary policies for player i that choose, at state y i , action a with probability in γ a y (i, z i ).
For any stationary multi-policy v define the occupation measures
where π vi i is the steady state (invariant) probability of the Markov chain describing the state process of player i, when her policy is v i . Note that a unique steady state probability exists by Assumption Π 1 and it does not depend on β. We thus often omit β from the notation. 
upper semi-continuous in z over the set of points which are feasible for LP(i, u) (i.e. the points that satisfy constraints (6)-(8)).
Proof: When all players other than i use u −i , then player i is faced with a constrained Markov decision process (with a single controller). The proof of (i) and (ii) then follows from [5] Theorems 2.6. The first part of (iii) follows from standard properties of Linear Programs, whereas the second part follows from an application of the theory of sensitivity analysis of Linear Programs by Dantzig, Folkman and Shapiro [10] in [5] Theorem 3.6 to LP(i, u). Finally, (iv) follows from the definition of g i (z).
Define the point to set map Ψ :
where z = (z 1 , . . . , z N ), each z i is interpreted as a point in M 1 (K i ) and g(z) = (g 1 (z 1 ), . . . , g N (z N )).
Proof of Theorem 2.1: By Kakutani's fixed point theorem, a fixed point z ∈ Ψ(z) exists. Proposition 3.1 (i) implies that for any such fixed point, the stationary multi-policy g = {g i (z i ); i = 1, ..., N } is a constrained Nash equilibrium. LP(i, u) is not only a tool for proving the existence of a constrained Nash equilibrium; in fact, due to Proposition 3.1 (ii), it can be shown that any stationary constrained Nash equilibrium w has the form w = {g i (z i ); i = 1, ..., N } for some z which is a fixed point of Ψ.
Remark 3.1 (i) The Linear Program formulation
(ii) It follows from [5] Theorems 2.4 and 2.5 that if z = (z 1 , ..., z N ) is a fixed point of Ψ, then any stationary multi-policy g in 
